We model worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-MortensenPissarides model of matching and unemployment. We show that heterogeneity, re ‡ecting di¤erences in match quality and worker assets, reduces the extent of ‡uctuations in separations and unemployment. We …nd that the model faces a trade-o¤-it cannot produce both realistic dispersion in wages across workers and realistic cyclical ‡uctuations in unemployment.
Introduction
, Hall (2005) , and Costain and Reiter (2003) each argue that matching models with ‡exible wages fail to explain business cycle ‡uctuations-the models generate much more procyclical wages and much less cyclical unemployment and job …nding rates than observed. But, as discussed by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) , this negative conclusion rests on an assumption that employment renders substantial economic rents relative to the monetary, home production, and leisure bene…ts to not being employed in the market.
For example, Hagedorn and Manovski, by allowing the payout to unemployment to replace 95 percent that of employment, are able to rationalize the cyclical volatility of unemployment under the matching model with ‡exible wages and exogenous separations. So establishing the rents from employment is key to judging how well the matching model captures cyclical ‡uctuations.
Judging the size of these rents a priori is problematic as they re ‡ect, not only direct payments, but also individuals'valuations of leisure and home production.
We shed light on this question by considering endogenous separations. We introduce heterogeneity in reservation wages into a business cycle model of separations, matching, and unemployment. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , we allow workers to face shocks to their employment matches, with bad draws possibly leading to endogenous separations. We depart from Mortensen and Pissarides by allowing for diminishing marginal utility in consumption and imperfect insurance as in Aiyagari (1994) . As a result, willingness to trade work for search depends on the worker's wealth-workers with lower savings, re ‡ecting bad past earnings shocks, are less willing to separate. The heterogeneity in match quality and assets jointly determine the distribution of rents to being employed. In turn, this distribution drives both the level and cyclicality of unemployment.
We …nd a trade-o¤ between generating realistic dispersion in wages re ‡ecting match quality and realistic cyclical ‡uctuations in unemployment. For instance, with the high replacement rate suggested by Hagedorn and Manovski, the model can generate reasonable average rates of separation and unemployment only if shocks to match quality are extremely small, so small that the cross-sectional standard deviation in wages from match quality is less than two percent. With Shimer's calibrated replacement rate of 40 percent, by contrast, substantial shocks to match quality are required to match average turnover and unemployment rates, with these shocks generating a cross-sectional standard deviation in wages from match quality of 18 percent.
We argue that this latter …gure, 18 percent, is consistent with micro data, in particular the importance of the match component to earnings dispersion estimated by Woodcock (2007) using matched worker-…rm data. Thus we conclude that the calibrated search and matching model, with reasonable wage dispersion, fails to capture the cyclicality of unemployment rates.
The model is presented in the next section then calibrated in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the model's steady-state features. We show that both a high replacement rate and little heterogeneity, in match quality and assets, are key for producing an economy with many workers with low rents from employment-the scenario that generates a large response of unemployment to aggregate shocks. We require our benchmark economy to exhibit realistic separation and unemployment rates and a reasonable dispersion in wages re ‡ecting match quality. In turn, this requires a relatively low replacement rate, comparable to Shimer's calibration, and signi…cant match quality shocks. We consider an alternative economy that matches the average unemployment with a high replacement rate, but it requires extremely small shocks to match quality.
The model's cyclical predictions are presented in Section 5. The model can generate a very cyclical unemployment rate, but only if there is little dispersion in match quality. With little cross-sectional dispersion there is an important spike up in separations at the onset of a downturn. Secondly, again for low dispersion, the rents to vacancy creation are highly procyclical. Thirdly, the model generates a new avenue for cyclicality in unemployment-in response to higher expected unemployment duration, separations become skewed toward workers with higher assets and higher reservation match qualities. Because these workers generate smaller expected surplus to employers, this acts to further depress vacancy creation in a recession. However, for our benchmark model that displays reasonable dispersion in match wages, we …nd that separations, vacancies, and unemployment all exhibit much less cyclicality than seen in the data.
Besides Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , an antecedent to our model is Kim (2006, 2007) . They show that the cross-sectional distributions of wealth and worker productivity play a critical role in determining the elasticity of aggregate labor supply in a competitive equilibrium. Nakajima (2007), Shao and Silos (2007) , and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2008) have also recently adopted diminishing marginal utility in consumption and imperfect risk sharing into the Mortensen-Pissarides model. 1 However, only Shao and Silos allow for heterogeneous 1 Other papers that entertain wealth e¤ects in modeling search include Pissarides (1987), Gomez, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001), and Hall (2006) . Haefke and Reiter (2006) generate dispersion in reservation wages, while maintaining linear utility and no match-speci…c productivity, by assuming heterogeneity in individuals' value of home production. Several papers (Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant, 1985 , Baker, 1992 , and Pries, 2007 have argued that lower job-…nding rates during recessions may re ‡ect a compositional shift toward workers who display productivity; and none of these authors allows for endogenous separations.
Model
We build on the model of cyclical unemployment in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . We depart from Mortensen and Pissarides by letting workers be risk averse, face a borrowing constraint, and value leisure, distinct from goods consumption, from being unemployed.
Environment
There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived workers with total mass equal to one. Each worker has preferences de…ned by ; ; where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor, and c t (> 0) is consumption. The parameter B denotes the utility from leisure when unemployed. l t is 1 when unemployed and otherwise zero. In
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and many extensions, there is no valuation of leisure; so a marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is not de…ned. Here the marginal rate of substitution (c =B ) is decreasing in c. This provides the basis for a worker's reservation match quality to be increasing in consumption and thereby savings.
Each period a worker either works (employed) or searches for a job (unemployed). A worker, when working, earns wage w. If unemployed, a worker receives an unemployment bene…t b.
Each can borrow or lend at a given real interest rate r by trading the asset a. But there is a limit, a, that one can borrow; that is a t > a. Real interest rate r is determined exogenously to ‡uctuations in this particular economy (small open economy).
There is also a continuum of identical agents we refer to as entrepreneurs (or …rms). Entrepreneurs have the ability to create job vacancies with a cost per vacancy. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral (diversifying ownership of their investments across many vacancies and across economies) and maximize the discounted present value of pro…ts
There are two technologies in this economy, one that describes the production of output by lower job-…nding rates. But these papers impose this shift exogenously, whereas our model, by allowing for wealth e¤ects, predicts such a shift in recessions toward unemployed workers with high reservation match qualities. a matched worker-entrepreneur pair and another that describes the process by which workers and entrepreneurs become matched. A matched pair produces output
where z t is aggregate productivity and x t is idiosyncratic match-speci…c productivity (i.e., match quality). Both aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic productivity evolve over time according to Markov processes, respectively P r[z t+1 < z 0 jz t = z] = D(z 0 jz) and P r[x t+1 < x 0 jx t = x] = F (x 0 jx). For newly formed matches, idiosyncratic productivity starts at the mean value of the unconditional distribution, which is denoted by x. 2 The number of new meetings between the unemployed and vacancies is determined by a matching function
where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed workers. The matching rate for an unemployed worker is p( ) = m(v; u)=u = , where = v=u is the vacancyunemployment ratio, the labor market tightness. The probability that a vacant job matches with a worker is q( ) = m(v; u)=v = 1 .
A matched worker-…rm constitutes a bilateral monopoly. We assume the wage is set by bargaining between the worker and …rm over the match surplus. This is discussed in the next subsection. The match surplus re ‡ects the value of the match relative to the summed worker's value of being unemployed and the entrepreneur's value of an unmatched vacancy (which is zero in equilibrium). There are no bargaining rigidities; separations are e¢ cient for the worker-…rm pair, occurring if and only if match surplus falls below zero.
The timing of events can be summarized as follows.
1. At the beginning of each period matches from the previous period's search and matching are realized. Also aggregate productivity z and each match's idiosyncratic productivity x are realized.
2. Upon observing x and z; matched workers and entrepreneurs decide whether to continue as an employed match. Workers breaking up with an entrepreneur become unemployed.
There is no later recall of matches.
3. For employed matches, production takes place with the wage re ‡ecting worker-…rm bargaining. Also at this time, unemployed workers and vacancies engage in the search/matching process.
Value functions
Consider a recursive representation, where W , U , J, and V denote respectively the values for the employed, unemployed, a matched entrepreneur, and a vacancy. All value functions depend on the measures of workers. In each labor market, two measures capture the distribution of workers: (a; x) and (a), respectively, represent the measures of employed workers and unemployed workers during the period. 3 The evolution of these measures is given by T, i.e., The value of being unemployed, recalling that p( ) is the probability that an unemployed worker matches, is
subject to
For an entrepreneur the value of a matched job is:
3)
The value of a vacancy is:
where recall that is the vacancy posting cost and q( ) is the probability that a vacancy is …lled. e (a 0 u ) denotes the measure of unemployed workers at the end of a period after decisions on asset accumulation are made.
Wage Bargaining
There is a setting for bilateral bargaining between a matched vacancy and worker. We follow much of the literature in assuming that wages re ‡ect a Nash bargaining solution, such that
for all (a; x; s). 4 The Nash solution generates a wage that is increasing in a worker's assets, re ‡ecting that being unemployed is less painful for a worker with greater assets. (Below see Figure 1 .) In turn, this makes the vacancy creation decision depend on the assets of the unemployed. We believe these features potentially generalize to settings with wage posting by …rms and directed search by workers. For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) model directed search by risk averse workers. They show that the distribution of posted wages exhibits a higher mean, with longer queues, if workers are less risk averse, as then workers are less willing to take lower wages in order to raise the probability of employment. We would expect increased assets for the unemployed, for given risk aversion, to exhibit comparative statics in this same direction in their setting.
Evolution of measures
The measures for workers employed and unemployed, (a; x) and (a), evolve as follows.
for all A 0 A and X 0 X .
Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, W (a; x; s), U (a; s), J(a; x; s), a set of decision rules for consumption c e (a; x; s), c u (a; s), asset holdings a 0 e (a; x; s), a 0 u (a; s), and separating x (a; x; s), the wage schedule w(a; x; s), the labor-market tightness (s), and a law of motion for the distribution, ( 0 ; 0 ) = T( ; ; z). Equilibrium is de…ned by the following. 
(Rational Expectations):
Given a 0 e , a 0 u and x , the law of motion for distribution ( 0 ; 0 ) = T( ; ) is described in (2.6) and (2.7).
Model Calibration
We calibrate our model in order to present its predictions for business cycle ‡uctuations. But, prior to considering cycles, in Section 4 we display the model's steady-state features, in particular showing how the heterogeneity of worker's match quality and assets determine the distribution of rents to employment.
The benchmark economy
We consider two calibrated models that yield the same steady-state rates of separations and unemployment, but di¤er sharply in their predictions for the average level, and dispersion, in match rents. Our benchmark calibration re ‡ects sizable rents to employment. These rents primarily re ‡ect dispersion in wages due to important di¤erences in match quality. We argue this cross-sectional dispersion is consistent with that estimated on matched employer, employee data (Woodcock, 2007) . We also describe an alternative calibration that is designed to generate sizable cyclical ‡uctuations. But this calibration requires remarkably small dispersion in match quality.
Starting with preferences, we assume a relative risk aversion parameter equal to one. We choose a monthly discount factor of 0.995 and an annualized real interest rate of 6 percent.
These together generate average assets equal to 18 months of labor earnings, which is about The key outcomes we target are the average rates of unemployment and separations. We target an average unemployment rate of 6 percent and a monthly separation rate of 2 percent.
(A separation rate of 2 percent is consistent with what we see for the SIPP data.) These rates for unemployment and separations imply a steady-state job …nding rate, of 0.313, a rate consistent with transition hazards reported by Meyer (1990) . The vacancy posting cost is chosen so that the vacancy-unemployment ratio ( ) is normalized to 1 in the steady state. The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas; m(v; u) = :313 v u 1 hits the steady-state …nding rate. We set the matching power parameter to 0.5.
Remaining to calibrate are the payouts to being unemployed, which are unemployment insurance b and leisure utility B, and the magnitude of match-speci…c shocks. These are key determinants of rates of separations and unemployment. If unemployment is made more attractive, everything else equal, this clearly leads to higher separation and unemployment rates. We calibrate our benchmark economy to generate rents to employment comparable to that in Shimer Greater match-quality shocks, like higher replacement rates, create more separations and higher average unemployment. We set the persistence of the match-speci…c shock to be quite high, x = 0:97. Finally, given the other parameters, we set the standard deviation of these match-quality shocks in order achieve the target separation and unemployment rates of 2 and 6
percent. This dictates x = 0:130. We …nd this generates a standard deviation of wages across workers of 18 percent. We view this as a reasonable match to data, as it is consistent with the size of the match component in the dispersion of earnings estimated by Woodcock (2007).
Woodcock allows for individual, employer, and match components in explaining dispersion in (ln)earnings for a large sample of matched employer-employee records across 37 states. He …nds a variance of the match component in earnings that is nearly one-…fth the magnitude of overall earnings variance. If we assume this same ratio holds for (ln)wage rates, and allow for a standard deviation for (ln)wages of 0.40 to 0.45, this implies a standard deviation in wages from match quality of 18 to 20 percent. 5 This is extremely close to our benchmark model's standard deviation of wages of 18 percent. 6 
The high-volatility economy
For contrast, we consider a cyclically sensitive economy calibrated so that, in response to aggregate shocks to productivity, it exhibits a standard deviation of unemployment that is 9.5
times that in productivity-where 9.5 re ‡ects the ratio of these standard deviations reported by Shimer (2005) . To achieve this targeted cyclicality, while maintaining an average rate of 6 5 Woodcock's sample re ‡ects 49 million person-year observations over the years 1990 to 1999 for workers aged 25 to 65. The data re ‡ect a matching of Census and state unemployment insurance data. The statement of a standard deviation for (ln)wages of 0.40 to 0.45 re ‡ects CPS data for 1990 to 2002 for workers ages 25 to 65. These data show standard deviations in ln(wages) of 0.44 for men and 0.43 for women. 6 The dispersion in wages for our model partially re ‡ects dispersion in assets, as wages are increasing in assets. But most of the wage dispersion for the model re ‡ects di¤erences in match quality. percent unemployment, we free up the leisure value of unemployment B and the variability of match-quality shocks x , keeping other parameters at their benchmark values. 7 The economic payo¤s while unemployed are key, not only to the average rate of unemployment, but also to its cyclical volatility (Hagedorn and Manovski, 2008 , and Mortensen and Nagypal, 2005)-less surplus to employment increases cyclical volatility of vacancies and unemployment. By contrast, greater volatility of match-speci…c productivity (higher x ) has opposite impacts on the level versus cyclical volatility of unemployment. Greater match-quality shocks create more separations and higher average unemployment, but actually reduce the cyclical volatility of separations and unemployment. With greater match-quality shocks workers become sorted over time into matches with signi…cant match surplus. This makes their separations less responsive to cyclical ‡uctuations in productivity. Because the level of unemployment is increasing in both B and x , but its cyclicality responds oppositely to the two parameters, we can maintain unemployment's average rate of 6 percent, while increasing its cyclicality, by appropriately increasing B in conjunction with decreasing x . We …nd that the combination B = 0:51; x = 0:014 produces a standard deviation of unemployment that is 9.5 times that for productivity. We show that this economy, though generating realistic cyclicality, yields implausibly little cross-sectional wage dispersion, with a standard deviation of wages of only 1.9 percent. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters with values employed for both the benchmark and high-volatility economies.
Steady-state Statistics and the Distribution of Match Rents
We present statistics for the model's steady state to illustrate how a worker's assets and match quality determine his wage, reservation match quality, and the surplus from employment. We focus on the distribution of surplus from employent because this is key in determining cyclicality of separations, vacancy creation, and unemployment for the model. We contrast the distribution of rents to employment from our benchmark model to those for the economy calibrated to generate high cyclical volatility in unemployment.
Starting with the benchmark economy, Figure 1 displays the values of the wage, W U; and J as functions of a worker's assets. These relations are illustrated for three di¤erent values for match quality x. Higher values of match quality are directly associated with higher wages and capitalized value of employment W , while irrelevant for U . So both W U and J correspondingly increase with match quality. Focusing on assets, both W and U increase with assets. But having low assets particularly lowers the value of being unemployed, resulting in a lower bargained wage. Figure 1 displays this positive relation between assets and wages. Both W U and J (re ‡ecting the higher wage) decrease in worker assets. The sharpest positive relation of the wage to assets, and opposite reaction in J, is concentrated at the very low end of assets, near or below zero. 8 Focusing on …rm rents J, we see that high assets lessens the expected rents of hiring a worker.
In turn this provides a channel from assets, speci…cally the assets of the unemployed, to vacancy creation-high assets among the unemployed, everything else equal, reduces desired vacancies.
This implies the cyclicality of assets for the unemployed will in ‡uence (oppositely) the cyclicality of vacancy creation.
The top panel of Figure 2 presents the distribution of assets separately for employed and unemployed workers. The model succeeds in generating a fairly wide dispersion in assets, given workers di¤er only in the history of the quality of employment matches and history of unemployment durations. Because the unemployed draw down assets to maintain consumption, they exibit average assets of 21 percent less than the employed (14.7 compared to 18.1). The unemployed exhibit lower consumption, by 9 percent, than the employed. The bottom panel of Figure   2 displays how a worker's critical value for match quality x depends positively on assets-the critical match quality increases with assets throughout the range of relevant asset holding. Projecting this policy for x on the distribution for assets in the top panel of Figure 2 yields the distribution for x . This distribution exhibits a standard deviation of 3.3 percent.
Statistics for unemployment, turnover, and assets for the benchmark economy are presented in Table 2 . The table also reports that the cross-sectional standard deviation of (ln)wages is 18.0 percent. As discussed under calibrating, we perceive this statistic to be quite consistent with the importance of the employer/employee match component in earnings dispersion, as estimated by Woodcock (2007) . Figure 4 presents the distribution of assets separately for employed and unemployed workers; the bottom panel displays how a worker's critical match quality x depends on assets.
Compared to the benchmark economy, the high-volatility economy generates a smaller dispersion of assets and, as a result, a smaller dispersion of x -the standard deviation of x is 0.8 percent for this economy, compared to 3.3 percent for the benchmark.
Statistics for the high-volatility economy are presented in the right-most column of Table   2 . For the high volatility economy assets and consumption di¤er little between the employed and unemployed. Re ‡ecting the small shocks to match quality, this economy exhibits a crosssectional standard deviation for (ln)wages of only 1.9 percent, which we view as unreasonably small. Figure 5 presents the distribution of workers' ln(wages) relative to reservation wage ln(w ). In order to match cyclical volatility of employment, this economy must exhibit a highly elastic aggregate labor supply. This is re ‡ected in a distribution for the di¤erential ln(w) ln(w ) that is limited to near zero-it averages only 3.0 percent for workers, with a standard deviation equal to only 1.8 percent. 9 A drop in match quality su¢ cient to reduce the wage by 10 percent, holding w una¤ected, would induce nearly 100 percent of workers to separate. Thus, while we are able to generate large cyclical ‡uctuations with this model, we highlight that there is a severe tradeo¤-achieving high cyclical volatility requires implausibly little dispersion in wages from match quality.
Business cycle predictions
We next characterize the business cycles properties of the model in response to exogenous shifts in aggregate productivity, contrasting results for the benchmark and high-volatility economies. Smith's (1998) "bounded rationality" method which approximates the distribution of workers by a limited number of its moments. In particular, we assume that agents make use of the average asset holdings of the economy and the fraction of workers who are employed. (The computational appendix gives more detail.). We generate 12,000 monthly periods for a model economy. After dropping the …rst 3,000 observations, we log and HP …lter the data to produce the business cycle statistics. 10 Key statistics are highlighted in Table 3 . In addition to our benchmark and high-volatility economies, for comparison the table provides results for a model with linear utility, exogenous separations, and no shocks to match quality. We refer to this, in Column 2, as the Shimer model because it is similar to the model calibrated in Shimer (2005) . Also for comparison, the …rst column reports the comparable statistics reported by Shimer for quarterly U.S. data for , where note that all standard deviations are expressed relative to that for labor productivity.
Shimer points out that the natural log of the unemployment series exhibits volatility, measured by standard deviation, that is 9.5 times that in labor productivity, whereas for his calibrated model unemployment displays lower volatility by a factor of about one half. Comparing results 1 0 We use H-P smoothing parameter of 9 10 5 on the monthly data to be comparable to Shimer's treatment. Finally, we turn to our high-volatility model, with results given in the last column of Table   3 . The model by construction generates observed volatility in unemployment. Its standard deviation for unemployment is eight times that produced by our benchmark model. Because it exhibits many workers with little employment surplus, separations are much more volatile than for the benchmark model-the standard deviation of separations is 9 times higher. This model also generates much more cyclical vacancies. This primarily re ‡ects that expected surplus of matches is only about one-tenth that for the benchmark economy. In other words, workers are highly concentrated at the margin. Therefore, a shock to aggregate productivity wields a much bigger percentage impact on expected surplus of matching. The high-volatility economy also generates a considerable skewing of separations during downturns toward workers with higher assets. 11 This shift toward workers with higher assets and higher reservation wages in recessions further drives down the value of vacancy creation. (This channel for volatility is distinctive to our model having both risk aversion and endogenous separations.) To separately quantify the impact of this cyclical sorting into unemployment by assets, we constructed a version of our highvolatility model where separations are exogenous, but display the same time series properties as the economy with endogenous separations. 12 We …nd that the selection of workers into the unemployment pool by assets increases the volatility of unemployment by about 12 percent.
Despite matching cyclical volatility of unemployment, the high-volatility economy displays the qualitative shortcomings of our benchmark model. In particular, separations are far too cyclical relative to vacancies. This model generates an even weaker Beveridge curve correlation between unemployment and vacancies, 0:19, than the benchmark economy. Finally, we repeat that this model can achieve its cyclicality for unemployment only by displaying an implausibly low cross-sectional dispersion for wages of just 1:9 percent.
Conclusions
We have introduced worker heterogeneity, in worker assets and match quality, into a model of separations, matching, and unemployment. We emphasize the trade-o¤ between producing realistic dispersion in wages or realistic cyclical ‡uctuations in unemployment. We can generate very high cyclicality of unemployment, comparable to U.S. data, if shocks to match quality are small and payouts to unemployment are high. But we …nd this simultaneously implies dispersion of less than two percent in wages due to match quality. We consider this implausible, given estimates of wage dispersion controlling for worker and …rm …xed e¤ects (Woodcock, 2007) . With lower payouts to unemployment, comparable to Shimer's calibration, and considerable match productivity shocks, we can generate a realistic dispersion in wages. But then the model falls drastically short in capturing cyclical ‡uctuations in unemployment of the magnitude displayed by the data.
How might the model be extended to overcome this con ‡ict between realistic wage dispersion and realistic unemployment cyclicality, while maintaining wage ‡exibility? This requires that the model produce little dispersion in the rents to employment, despite considerable dispersion in wages due to match productivity. One way to generate small employment rents, with signi…cant is considerly greater for the high-volatility economy, re ‡ecting its much greater cyclicality of separations.
wage dispersion, is to assume that productivity in the market and productivity in home tasks are highly correlated across workers; this weakens the link from a worker's relative productivity in the market to comparative advantage in market work. But it is di¢ cult to make this case for di¤erences in market productivity that re ‡ect match quality-why would drawing a good employer match be associated with comparably higher home productivity? Another approach is to modify the environment to generate a stronger inverse relationship between a worker's match quality and the worker's marginal utility of consumption. Our model, because it assumes no insurance and limited borrowing, does generate higher consumption, and lower marginal utility of consumption, for workers with higher match wages. But we anticipate that breaking the link between match productivity and rents to employment would require extreme assumptions on preferences and/or the availabiltiy of asset markets.
A. Computational Algorithm
A.1. Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady state, the aggregate productivity z is constant at its mean and the measures of workers and are invariant over time. Computing the steady-state equilibrium amounts to …nding i ) the value functions W (a; x), U (a) and J(a; x), ii ) the decision rules a 0 e (a; x), a 0 u (a) and x (a), iii ) the wage schedule w(a; x), iv ) the labor market tightness , v ) the time-invariant measures (a; x) and (a) that satisfy the equilibrium conditions given in subsection 2.5. The detailed computational algorithm for steady state equilibrium is as follows.
1. Discretize the state space A X over which the value functions and wages are computed.
The stochastic process for the idiosyncratic productivity is approximated by the …rst-order Markov process of which transition probability matrix is computed using Tauchen's (1986) algorithm.
2. Assume an initial value of 0 .
3. Given 0 , we solve the Nash bargaining and individual optimization problems to approximate wages, value functions, and decision rules in the steady state, which will be used to compute the time-invariant measures.
1. Assume an initial wage schedule w 0 (a; x; 0 ) for each (a; x) node.
2. Given w 0 (a; x; 0 ), solve for the worker's value functions, W (a; x; w 0 ) and U (a; w 0 ), using equations (2.1) and (2.2) in the text. The value functions are approximated using the iterative method. The utility maximization problems in the worker's value functions are solved through the Brent method. The decision rules a 0 e (a; x; w 0 ), a 0 u (a; w 0 ) and x (a; w 0 ) are obtained at each iteration of the value functions. where J(a; x; w 0 ) is computed using the …rst order condition for the Nash bargaining problem in (2.5):
J(a; x; w 0 ) = 1 W (a; x; w 0 ) U (a; w 0 ) c e (a; x; w 0 ):
4. If w 1 (a; x; 0 ) and w 0 (a; x; 0 ) are close enough to each other, then move on to the step 4 to compute invariant measures and the corresponding labor market thightness, 1 . Otherwise, go back to the step 3.1 with a new guess for the wage schedule:
4. Using the converged decision rules a 0 e (a; x; w 0 ), a 0 u (a; w 0 ) and x (a; w 0 ) given the converged wage schedule w 0 (a; x; 0 ) from the step 3.2 and 3.1, compute the time-invariant measures (a; x; 0 ) and (a; 0 ) by iterating the laws of motion for measures given in (2.6) and (2.7). Then, compute the labor market tightness 1 that satis…es the free-entry condition using equation (2.4) and the converged measures:
5. If 1 and 0 are close enough to each other, then we found the steady state. Otherwise, go back to the step 3 with a new guess for the labor market tightness:
A.2. Equilibrium with Aggregate Fluctuations
Approximating the equilibrium in the presence of aggregate ‡uctuations requires us to include the aggregate productivity, z, and the measures of workers, and , as state variables for agents' optimization problems. In order to make match separation decisions at the end of a period, agents need to know their matching probabilities in the next period, p( t+1 ) and q( t+1 ), which in turn depends on the next period's measures of workers, t+1 (a; x) and t+1 (a). The laws of motion for the measures are given in equations (2.6) and (2.7). It is impossible to keep track of the evolution of these measures. We employ Krusell-Smith's (1998) "Bounded Rationality" method which approximates the distribution of workers by a number of its moments. We assume that agents in the economy make use of two …rst moments of the measures: the average asset holdings of the economy,
, and the number of employed workers,
. Letŝ denote a vector of aggregate state variables in the approximation of equilibrium with ‡uctuations. Thenŝ = (K; E; z). In addition we assume that the agents use log-linear rules in predicting the current , the future K and the future E.
1. Guess a set of prediction rules for the equilibrium labor market tightness ( ) in the current period, the average asset of the economy (K 0 ) and the number of employed workers (E 0 ) in the next period. This step amounts to setting the coe¢ cients of the log-linear prediction rules:
As is the case in the steady state computation, we approximate the stochastic process for the aggregate productivity by the …rst-order Markov process of which transition probability matrix is computed using Tauchen's (1986) algorithm.
2. Given these prediction rules, we solve the individual optimization and wage bargaining problems. This step is analogous to step 3 in the steady state computation, so we omit the detailed description of computational procedure. However, the dimension of state variables is now much larger: (a; x;ŝ). Computation of the conditional expectations involves the evaluation of the value functions not on the grid points along K and E dimensions since K 0 and E 0 are predicted by the log-linear rule above. We polynomially interpolate the value functions along the K dimension when necessary.
3. We generate a set of arti…cial time series data f t ; K t ; E t g of the length of 9,000 periods.
Each period, these aggregate variables are calculated by summing up 50,000 workers' decisions on asset accumulation and match separation, which are simulated using the converged value functions, W (a; x;ŝ), U (a;ŝ), and J(a; x;ŝ), the decision rules, a 0 e (a; x;ŝ), a 0 u (a;ŝ) and x (a;ŝ) from the step 2, and the assumed prediction rules for , K 0 and E 0 from the step 1. where i = ; K; E and j = 0; ; 3.
The converged prediction rules and their accuracy, measured by R 2 , for the benchmark calibration with h = 1 are as follows.
Prediction for labor market thightness in the current period: log = 1:934 0:05810 log K + 0:4220 log E + 0:14804 log z; R 2 = 0:9971
Prediction for average asset holdings in the next period:
log K 0 = 0:0096 + 0:9965 log K 0:0071 log E + 0:0457 log z; R 2 = 0:9999
Prediction for number of employed workers in the next period:
log E 0 = 0:0182 0:0015 log K + 0:6361 log E + 0:0276 log z; R 2 = 0:9538
Overall, the estimated prediction rules are fairly precise as R 2 's are close to 1, while the prediction rule for average asset holdings provides the highest accuracy. Table 1 for parameter values for the two calibrations. The simulated data from the models are monthly deviation from the H-P trend with smoothing parameter 9 x 10 5 . The productivity shock used in the simulation exhibits the same persistence and standard deviation to the U.S. quarterly data reported in Shimer (2005) . 
